The TSA uses various methods to assess its screener employees, but the results of one technique that has drawn substantial attention—use of covert testing—are of questionable value, GAO has said.
The covert testing program has attracted the attention of Congress and outside experts, following tests separately conducted by the IG’s office at TSA. In response to those findings of vulnerabilities, the parent DHS directed TSA to conduct further training for all screeners and their supervisors.
GAO noted that the TSA measures screener performance through annual proficiency reviews, assessments of X-ray machine operators’ ability to identify prohibited items by projecting fictional threat items, such as guns or explosives, onto X-ray images of actual baggage, and covert testing programs that use role players to take prohibited items through screening checkpoints to test them or determine how they interact with the public, among other things.
However, “due to software compatibility issues and a lack of automatic uploading capability, airport reporting on assessments of X-ray machine operators was not complete for each year of data GAO examined . . . In addition, for the data it does collect on these assessments, TSA has not taken steps to analyze these data nationwide, which could help the agency identify potential trends or opportunities to improve TSO performance.”
Further, in 2015 the TSA determined that prior year results of one of its two covert testing programs were unreliable, resulting in pass rates that were likely higher than actual performance, it said. Also, the TSA “does not require or track implementation by field personnel of national recommendations related to these covert tests, thereby limiting the agency’s ability to take advantage of the corrective actions identified from the tests.”
