The Department of Defense’s revised acquisitions policy aimed at curbing cost and schedule problems for major weapons systems has largely failed, Government Accountability Office has said.
It said the department plans to invest $1.3 trillion between 2005 and 2009 in researching, developing, and procuring major weapons systems but that numerous programs have been marked by cost overruns, schedule delays and reduced performance.
After assessing whether knowledge-based, evolutionary principles are being effectively implemented under the department’s revised policy and if effective controls and specific criteria are in place and being used to make sound investment decisions, GAO said changes made over the past five years have not eliminated cost and schedule problems.
It said of the 23 major programs it assessed, 10 already expect development costs overruns of over 30 percent or have delayed delivery of initial capability by at least a year.
Poor execution of the revised acquisition policy is a major cause of DoD’s continued problems, according to GAO-06-368.
It said the department frequently bypasses key steps of the knowledge-based process outlined in the policy, does not attain key knowledge, and continues to pursue leaps in capability rather than more realistic, incremental advances.
The Pentagon’s policy continues to allow managers to approach major investment decisions with many unknowns, but without effective controls that require program officials to satisfy specific criteria, it is difficult to hold decision makers or program managers accountable to cost and schedule targets, the report said.
Further, it said that while decision-making transparency is crucial in this environment, DoD is lacking in this area as well.
