Systemic problems both at the strategic and at the program level underlie cost growth and schedule delays, GAO said.
It said that at the strategic level, the department’s processes for identifying war-fighter needs, allocating resources, and developing and procuring weapon systems are fragmented and broken.
Further, at the program level, weapon system programs are initiated without sufficient knowledge about system requirements, technology, and design maturity.
This has led managers to rely on assumptions GAO said are consistently too optimistic and in turn, exposed programs to significant and unnecessary risks and ultimately cost growth and schedule delays.
At the same time, frequent turnover of program managers and an increased reliance on contractors increases the government’s risk of losing accountability, GAO told the committee.
It expressed some hope that several DoD initiatives based in part on congressional direction and GAO recommendations could, if implemented properly, could provide a foundation for establishing a well balanced investment strategy, sound business cases for major weapon system acquisition programs, and a better chance to spend resources wisely.
For example, Congress recently enacted legislation requiring decision-makers to certify that programs meet specific criteria at key decision points and early on in the acquisition process.
Still, DoD investment decisions continue to be dictated by the services, which propose programs that over-promise capabilities and underestimate costs in order to capture the funding needed to start and sustain development programs, GAO told the committee.
