Deficiencies the inspectors identified in post visits included missing weapons and batons, non working flashlights, and expired or missing pepper spray. Image: Foolish Productions/Shutterstock.com
By: FEDweek StaffFollowing are key sections from a report by the inspector general’s office at DHS expressing concerns about the knowledge, equipment and incident response authority of contracted security officers, called protective security officers, or PSOs, stationed at federal buildings.
PSOs Did Not Always Demonstrate the Knowledge Needed to Respond to Physical Threats
Inspectors noted the PSOs lacked knowledge of operational procedures in 218 of the 258 records we reviewed. For example:
• In a December 2019 post visit to a New York, New York facility, a PSO did not fully understand the procedures to take in the event of an active shooter.
• In a May 2020 post visit to a Chicago, Illinois facility, a PSO did not know what level of force was appropriate when dealing with a civil disturbance.
• In an April 2022 post visit to a Philadelphia, Pennsylvania facility, a PSO did not fully understand bomb threat procedures.
• In a June 2022 post visit to a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania facility, a PSO did not have adequate knowledge of how to handle prohibited firearms. In this instance, the PSO instructed a facility visitor to put their firearm in the bushes and re-enter the facility.
• In a January 2023 post visit to a Washington, DC facility, a PSO did not know how to respond to an armed person.
PSOs Did Not Always Have the Equipment Needed to Respond to Physical Threats
Although not required to verify PSO equipment during their post visits, inspectors identified deficiencies related to equipment PSOs needed to respond to physical threats in 19 of the 258 records we reviewed. FPS requires PSOs to carry and maintain specific equipment and outlines those requirements in its contracts. For example, the template for the FPS Statement of Work for Protective Security Officer Services (July 2019) requires that PSOs maintain equipment such as personal identity verification cards, handheld metal detectors, flashlights, firearms, and communication devices.
Deficiencies the inspectors identified in post visits included missing weapons and batons, non working flashlights, and expired or missing pepper spray. In an August 2022 post visit in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, the FPS inspector identified multiple equipment deficiencies, including a guard not having a tactical vest, baton, and pepper spray as contractually required.
In addition to reviewing the LEIMS records, we inspected posts at Federal facilities in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and in the Chicago, Illinois area to ensure PSOs met their contractual obligations related to protecting Federal facilities. We designed our inspections in accordance with FPS Directive 15.9.1.3, PSO Oversight and Monitoring Program (September 2022), PSO/Site Inspection Checklist. We observed that the PSOs did not always have required equipment including ammunition or functional flashlights. For example, two PSOs did not have flashlights on their person, and one PSO did not have all required ammunition.
PSOs Did Not Always Have Authority to Respond to Active Shooters Outside Their Posts
Executive Order 129775 created the Interagency Security Committee, “to enhance the quality and effectiveness of security in and protection of buildings and facilities in the United States occupied by Federal employees for nonmilitary activities (“Federal facilities”), and to provide a permanent body to address continuing government-wide security for Federal facilities …” When oversight of FPS transferred from the U.S. General Services Administration to DHS after Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS became the chair of the Committee. The Committee consists of more than 60 Federal departments and agencies. The Committee published the Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide (2021 Edition), which states that in an active shooter situation, “Often, intervention is required to stop the shooter and mitigate harm to potential victims.”
Notwithstanding the Committee’s guidance, PSOs cannot leave their assigned posts to respond to active shooter situations occurring elsewhere in the Federal facility. According to the Security Manual, when PSOs encounter physical threats (such as workplace violence, demonstrations, bomb threats, suspicious packages, or active shooters), they should observe the incident, call for backup, assist law enforcement personnel, and secure the scene and control the crowd . . .
FPS officials recognize these challenges and have been working with the Office of Management and Budget to seek legislation that would give the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to grant PSOs limited firearm and arrest authority. Because of their current efforts, we are not making a recommendation to address PSOs’ lack of authority.
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